A review of the Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) flight data revealed that the Beech E-35 departed from Glendale Municipal Airport (KGEU) in Arizona, its home base, at approximately 6:25 a.m.
Following a normal takeoff from Runway 19, the pilot conducted maneuvers predominantly to the south before altering his course westward towards Buckeye Municipal Airport (KBKX).
About 20 minutes later, the airplane passed to the south of KBKX, then executed a right turn to adopt a northward heading.
Approximately five miles north of KBKX, the airplane initiated a descending 270° left turn, followed by a right turn as it continued on a southbound trajectory indicative of a direct approach towards Runway 17 at KBKX.
The airplane executed a low approach, reaching an altitude of approximately 200 feet above ground level (AGL) before initiating a level right turn near the midpoint of Runway 17. The airplane proceeded beyond a parallel runway heading toward the downwind leg and then began angling toward Runway 17, maintaining an altitude of about 200 feet AGL and a speed between 63 to 68 knots.
The last recorded ADS-B data point occurred at 6:54, at which point it recorded the airplane was approximately 0.43 miles west-northwest from the threshold of Runway 17.
The airport was equipped with a VirTower traffic monitoring system. An image of the airplane’s flight path in the traffic pattern was recovered that mostly mirrored the flight path generated by the ADS-B data.
The VirTower flight path continued past the last recorded ADS-B point and showed the airplane made a right turn and maintained a heading of about 030° before the flight track ended near the accident location bearing 313° and .22 miles from the approach end of Runway 17.
There were no witnesses to the accident and there were no recorded communications from the airplane while it operated in the KBKX traffic pattern.
The airplane hit flat desert terrain. Impact marks on the ground were consistent with the airplane hitting the ground in a nose- and left-wing-low attitude. A propeller cut mark was observed in the dirt near the engine impact point.
A post-impact fire destroyed the airplane. The student pilot and flight instructor were fatally injured.
The fuselage and cockpit from the firewall aft to about two feet forward of the empennage was consumed by fire. Cockpit instrumentation, switches, and controls were mostly destroyed by fire.
Flight control continuity was verified to all control surfaces from the cockpit. The left and right flaps were in the retracted position and the position of the flap control handle could not be determined. All landing gear were in the extended position.
Both propeller blades exhibited leading edge polishing and chordwise scratches. One blade was bent aft about 45° near the midpoint of the blade and was loose on the hub. The second blade was bent aft about 80° about 1/3 the length of the blade outward from the hub.
Engine continuity, cylinder compression, and valvetrain continuity were verified by rotating the propeller by hand. The top spark plugs were removed and exhibited normal burn signatures.
The flight instructor’s logbooks were not located during the investigation and his experience in the make and model of aircraft could not be determined. The student pilot’s logbook contained only one entry indicating he had operated the airplane prior to the accident. The entry stated the student pilot and the flight instructor attempted to fly together in the accident airplane on June 11, 2022. The entry indicated the student pilot logged 0.5 hours of dual instruction received. The entry also stated “Flight with intention of taking off, lost coms holding short.” The entry was signed by the flight instructor.
Probable Cause: The pilots’ failure to climb and complete a normal traffic pattern after making a low approach and their failure to extend the flaps for reasons that could not be determined, and the flight instructor’s failure to ensure adequate airspeed and bank control during the turn to final approach, which resulted in an accelerated stall.
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This June 2022 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
Accidents like this will continue because spins and full stalls are not taught. Pilots have no idea where the edge of the envelope is! They think because they are legal to fly a plane they don’t need a check out in different types.
I read the whole report. The Pilot receivng instruction was on a med where flight is prohibitted, and if this one is listed on your medical, medical to not be issued. The CFI had massive infusion of blood in an effort to save his life. Toxicology for him was not going to be useful.
Here are my questions:
1) Was the altimeter set to read high, having them fly 300-500 feet low? Personally, I can tell when I’m low.
2) Were they doing slow flight checking out the characteristics of the plane in the pattern? (not smart — need altitude in case of spin).
I fear something else was going on, and we will never know the root cause of this fatal crash.
But I do agree with you, Leigh Smith, and I argued this back in the mid-1970s, that spin recovery needed to be taught to new pilots and not just required of CFIs. But the FAA apparently thought that teaching people to recognize a stall and recover would protect from stall/spin. And now we see too many stall spin crashes. And some of them, there was not enough altitude to recover from the spin.
Buckeye Municipal is KBXK.