The flight instructor reported that the airline transport pilot receiving instruction had not flown a float-equipped airplane in three years, so the flight instructor considered the training flights as review.
The flight instructor stated that, during their two-hour morning flight near Winter Haven, Florida, the pilot receiving instruction sat in the front seat of the Piper J-3 Cub and that he tended to “fly too slow” after takeoff and “turn sharply.” The instructor further stated that he had to “push the nose down on several occasions.”
After eating lunch and refueling the airplane, the afternoon flight began, with the pilot receiving instruction sitting in the rear seat. The instructor estimated that they flew about an hour when the accident occurred.
Although the flight instructor did not recall the details of the accident, he did recall thinking that the pilot receiving instruction might not have been able to see the instruments well from the rear seat or that he was being inattentive. The pilot receiving instruction had no recollection of the accident flight.
A witness near the accident site stated that he saw the airplane fly one low pass over the lake, circle to the right, and then come around and descend again toward the lake. The witness stated that airplanes typically either land on the lake or fly a low pass but that the accident airplane made a small splash on the second pass when the right float touched the water. The airplane then “accelerated up” a couple hundred feet and started veering to the right in a “big arc.”
The witness also stated that the turn “seemed like a steep angle” and that, at the top of the arc, he saw “the whole top of the airplane and it just continued downward.”
The witness could not hear the engine when the airplane was descending.
He stated that the airplane hit the ground in a near-vertical nose-down attitude and that the airplane stayed in that position for a short time before the tail settled toward the ground.
The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction sustained serious injuries.
During a post-accident interview, the flight instructor stated that the witness’ description of the second pass sounded as if it were a go-around maneuver. The flight instructor also stated that the pilot receiving instruction had been “making really steep turns and he was too slow on airspeed.” The instructor added that he did not correct it in time.
Post-accident examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane came to rest in a near-vertical nose-down attitude with no ground scars or tree damage leading toward the wreckage, consistent with a near-vertical flightpath angle. The left wing sustained substantial damage.
Probable Cause: The pilot receiving instruction’s failure to maintain airspeed during a turn, which resulted in an exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor’s failure to take remedial action in a timely manner.
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This January 2022 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
A 280 hour CFI? Wow. I’m sure there are good ones out there but that sure seems green.
Too many young, new CFI’s get into the situation of giving dual to multi hour
airline or military pilot, and are in awe, which may. skew their behavior.
Some of my airline friends talk about their 30,00;hours, and I remind them that it’s
the same hour, repeated 30,000 times.
I have a few thousand hours in Pitts aircraft, and every hour is different.
I’m not judging which are better pilots, just that our experience is entirely different.
Can a brand new CFI ( I was one once) make judgements to modify their attitude
about they person they are flying with?
I did SES add ons for years in AK. One of the things I noted almost universally with wheel plane pilots, who’d done most/all their flying from airports, was how quickly they got very comfortable, flying very low, and maneuvering hard…very .steep turns at 200 feet, etc. take away conventional traffic pattern procedures, and many of them would fly low, slow and steep, unless they were admonished and monitored carefully. I think it has to do with “freedom” or ?? But it is dangerous. Float flying is ALWAYS an “off airport” operation, which demands careful examination of what you’re about to land on. Hard to do adequately from 1000 agl. Once that “rule” goes away, Katie bar the door. And the CFI had best be on his/her game.
In this and many other similar situations, age and experience on the part of the young CFI are definitely THE most significant contributing factor.
Instructors must excercise the authority they have as instructors.
Students, no matter how much experience they have, MUST assume the role of student with all the humility that position dictates.
The school should have sent up the senior CFI.
This particular “student” should, at the very least, lose his ATP. I wouldn’t want him cowboying my family around. He should also buy the airplane and it’s replacement, cover the schools increased insurance premiums and all other expenses related to this incident, pay the kids hospital bills and cover his income while he’s laid up, just to name a few.
It’s one thing to be confident. It’s all together something else to be cocky!
Should have reved up to the designated speed between 60 and 300 kms an hr on the runway depending size of plane such like A380 and a small plane
It should be the actions of an instructor when a student, regardless of their experience and tickets, to take control and stop the flight, direct them that they are performing in unacceptable unsafe actions after which this session will be terminated if they don’t comply. I have done that providing instruction to airline pilots and a KC-135 IP who wouldn’t follow safe procedures. Remember it’s your butt in the airplane too! 60 yr CFI.
A brand new 23-year-old, 280-hour CFI “instructing” a 77-year-old, multi-thousand hour ATP. “Reticence” a factor? Absolutely.
The young CFI let the old ATP decide to fly from the back seat. He recalls thinking “…he is more reckless”. Rusty stick & rudder skills, plus “inattention”?
Or trying to show off for a young pup that is too intimidated to take command?
It would be interesting to hear their pre-crash conversations.
Make that…22-years-old…
I fly for a 135 float operation (beavers and turbine otters) and still instruct on our trainers and man, you would have to be cranking and banking a cub so hard/fast for this. It’s not fun to be a buzzkill and rein in a hotshot, but end of the day can’t let the student play right on the edge in situations where there is no recovery when they slip.
Additional ratings, like Single Engine Sea require at the very least a Private Pilot Certificate. Hence, from the CFI point of view they are dealing w/ a certificated pilot. A CFI needs to first discuss currancy and in the ibtroduction to flight in the SESeaplane, assess his skill level. After 20+ years of owning/operating a Seaplane Base, we turned away 1 Spartan student who did not possess enough ability to fly the 7GCBC aircraft. We refunded his money 100% and told him to seek flight time, gain some flight experience and come back in 3 months. He had flown into a local grass strip and proceeded to hit a hay bail upon landing. Yes, he did return some months later and did well.
That said, we had many Pilot’s that flew heavy equipment come thru our Part 141 School. We hired a CFI to help out w/ the load. We preached, always guard the controls and keep your head on a swivel w/ these Pilot’s. They are not used to slower performance of the seaplanes. Their Stick & Rudder skills are usually lacking. But most of all, be aware of the dreaded “Take Off& Departure Stall. BH, CFI experienced this early in his Seaplane Instruction. The 7GCBC fell off as the Student horses the aircraft into the air, hovering in T-Effect a wing’s width above the water w/ ineffective ailerons. Stalling, left wingtip slapped the water and the wing broke at the bell crank/strut attach fitting. The Instructor water-taxied back to the Marina, dropped the student and was smart enough to water-taxi the aircraft back to the SPB 5mi away. It is difficult as a Pilot of Jets/Heavy Equipment to always be proficient in light single engine aircraft.
But in Life, especially in Flying, we must “apply that which we have learned before we take on an Additional Rating and/or Teach”.
PSH
The instructor didn’t do his job.
Interesting. There have been a number of posts recently in cases in which the flight instructor failed to grab the stick and correct whatever problem showed itself. What is their reticence? Do they think the pilot will be scared into corrective action? I have a close friend who is a CFI and certified in numerous airplanes. He tells me he wouldn’t hesitate to immediately grab the wheel and get the situation fixed rather than risk death and a busted airplane. Anybody else similarly curious and have theories about reticent CFIs?
Regards/J
When to respond to a deviation is a constant challenge for a CFI. If done too early, the pilot in training isn’t given a chance to learn how to make corrections. If done too late, either the maneuver will not be performed correctly or control will be lost.
My personal latitude given to students varies depending on situation and how many ‘outs’ I still have should they make an error. If we’re low, slow and nowhere to go? Then I have mental redlines on bank angle and stick force that I warn students if they approach and take control if they are still going to exceed. If we’re 4500’ AGL Then I’ll let them unintentionally stall for the teachable moment.