The Piper PA-46 departed Muskogee-Davis Regional Airport (KMKO) in Oklahoma, destined for Williston Municipal Airport (X60) in Florida, on an instrument flight rules flight plan. On the flight plan, the pilot indicated a planned cruise altitude of 23,000 feet mean sea level (msl).
According to archived air traffic control (ATC) information, ATC advised the pilot about moderate precipitation along the route of flight.
The pilot reported climbing through 16,000 feet msl. A review of flight track data revealed that as the airplane climbed through 18,600 feet msl, its ground speed was 171 knots, and a gradual reduction in ground speed began. After reaching 20,200 feet msl, the airplane began to descend on a southeast heading. Just before it began to descend, the airplane’s ground speed had decreased to 145 knots.
No further radio communications were received from the pilot, and he did not respond to repeated calls from the controller.
About two minutes after the descent began, the airplane began a right turn to the northeast and continued on that heading for about 30 seconds. The flight path then became erratic before the data ended. The last radar return was about 1,000 feet south of the accident site near Danville, Arkansas.
The airplane was destroyed and all four on board died in the crash.
A search was immediately initiated, and the airplane was located the next morning. The airplane was found in an area of densely forested terrain at an elevation of about 930 feet. During the on-scene portion of the investigation, the outboard portion of the right wing, right aileron, right horizontal stabilizer, and right elevator were not located in the vicinity of the main wreckage. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted numerous search missions using a small unmanned aircraft system, however, no additional wreckage was located.
Examination of the wreckage indicated that the missing wing and tail sections had separated in flight in a manner consistent with overload.
Based upon the weight of the cargo, passengers, airplane, and fuel from the filed flight plan, at the time of departure from KMKO, the airplane would have been about 361 pounds over maximum gross weight. The seating locations of two of the passengers could not be determined, which precluded determination of the airplane’s center of gravity. According to the FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, an overloaded airplane “may exhibit unexpected and unusually poor flight characteristics,” which include reduced maneuverability and an increased stall speed.
Research into weather conditions found the current icing product (CIP) indicated a 40% to 60% probability of icing at 14,000, 16,000 and 18,000 feet msl above the accident site. The CIP also indicated that the icing would be in the “light” category above 14,000 feet msl with pockets of “moderate to heavy” along the flight track leading to the accident location.
In addition, the CIP indicated an unknown probability of supercooled large droplets (SLD) above 12,000 feet msl at the accident site.
The forecast icing product (FIP) 1-hour forecast valid for the time of the accident indicated a 30% to 50% probability of icing at 14,000 to 18,000 feet msl over the accident area. The FIP also indicated that the icing intensity near the accident site would range from “moderate” to “heavy.”
The closest forecast point to the accident site was Fort Smith, Arkansas (KFSM). The KFSM forecast indicated wind at 12,000 feet msl from 250° at 23 knots with a temperature of -2°C, wind at 18,000 feet msl from 260° at 37 knots with a temperature of -16°C, and wind at 24,000 feet msl from 240° at 54 knots with a temperature of -26°C.
The pilot received weather information from Leidos Flight Service about 1554 and had additional discussions with Leidos Flight Service through about 1620.
Additionally, a search of archived ForeFlight information indicated the pilot did request and receive weather information from ForeFlight at 1525.
During the Leidos contact, the weather briefer mentioned the AIRMETs in effect for the accident flight and the text Leidos weather information contained all the valid weather forecast at the time of departure. In addition, the weather briefing information requested by and provided to the pilot at 1525 contained all the standard imagery valid at the departure time, to include the AIRMETs and SIGMETs valid along the route of flight. The vertical cross section forecast provided by ForeFlight indicated the flight would traverse an area of forecast moderate icing conditions.
A review of the pilot’s FAA airman certification file revealed multiple notices of disapproval issued when the pilot failed various practical tests for flight certificates or ratings. The first notice was issued March 20, 2015, in conjunction with the pilot’s application for a private pilot certificate. The notice stated that upon reapplication the pilot would be reexamined in practical test standards areas of operation “VII. Navigation” and “VIII. Slow flight and stalls.”
The second disapproval notice was issued on Dec. 1, 2018, in conjunction with the pilot’s application for a flight instructor certificate. The designated pilot examiner wrote that the pilot was unsatisfactory in three technical subject areas: Principals of flight, turning tendency, preflight preparation; determination of weight and balance condition, use of performance charts, tables, and other data in determining performance in various phases of flight; and preflight lesson on a maneuver to be performed in flight.
Two disapproval notices were issued in conjunction with the pilot’s application for the addition of an instrument rating to his flight instructor certificate. On the first failure, dated Oct. 20, 2019, the two unsatisfactory areas were preflight preparation – cross country flight planning and navigation systems – intercepting and tracking navigational systems and distance measuring equipment (DME) arcs. On the second failure, dated July 10, 2020, the two unsatisfactory areas were precision and non-precision instrument approach procedures.
The pilot’s airman knowledge test reports were reviewed, and the subject matter knowledge codes were researched. Although not all inclusive, areas answered incorrectly over multiple exams included meteorology, aircraft performance to include weight and balance, aeronautical decision making, stall characteristics/factors/recovery/precautions, and angle of attack characteristics.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s improper decision to continue flight in an area of moderate-to-heavy icing conditions, which resulted in exceedance of the airplane’s anti-icing system capabilities, a degradation of aircraft performance, and subsequent aerodynamic stall.
To download the final report. Click here. This will trigger a PDF download to your device.
This April 2021 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
One possibility not mentioned is hypoxia. It would account for erratic flight and no communications.
Hard to say, but I don’t see that any of the mentioned irregularities or history necessarily has anything to do with the accident given the distance traveled and altitude at the time.
And I certainly have had more than one weather briefing that was completely inaccurate in the worst way in less than two hours, so no vote of confidence there.
Perhaps not grasping at straws would better serve the community.
Sounds like he was destined to end up like this.
Just a matter of when.
Thank the Lord he never became a CFI.
Sad for his passengers.
Story states he was on a south east course THEN turned right to a North east course…wouldnt that have been a LEFT hand turn to switch from SE to NE ?
A NE course is possible by making a right hand turn.
A sad story. Had he been more IFR experienced he probably would have changed routes or dates of travel. This was not directly mentioned but stood out to me.
>>> IFR second failed test dated July 10, 2020. Not sure when he did pass, it did not say.
>>> Accident was April 23, 2021.
He showed 1400 hours but who knows how much instrument time?
Was most of his time doing the same VFR flights? We don’t know. But the small amount of time between IFR ticket and crash is most likely the biggest factor. First year (or two) IFR pilots still have a lot to learn.
I concur with your points Jim Macklin. I would have flown a different route or would have delayed the flight for safety reasons.
From all I have read out of the NTSB report (via the provided link): it troubles me to say this, but this guy was a crash waiting to happen.
What I do not understand is why climb up into known moderate icing? Even with FIKI, this is something I would avoid. Especially when the manuals for the aircraft warn against super cooled droplets and moderate icing which could overcome the system or be beyond the limits the plane was certified for. But this is what he had been dinged on most — improper/lacking preflight planning and weather conditions.
Some people are totally unrealistic about their capabilities and limitations. This man sought to be a flight instructor but was officially ‘dinged’ on aeronautical and meteorological basics. RIP pilot and passengers duped into flying with him. Regards/J
Unlike a scheduled airline, GA can delay, deviate and change destination as needed. Airlines can just cancel.
Even being 10% over gross at takeoff the weight would have been below certified GW at the time.
An after CG makes control forces very light and pulling too many Vs is very easy. A forward CG.makes just raising the pitch impossible.
Improper flight planning route selection, no W&B and a determination to. Fly the shortest route can mean a crash.