Based on information garnered from FlightAware, the flight departed Saint Louis Downtown Airport (KCPS) in Missouri, at 1051 and arrived at Omar N. Bradley Airport (KMBY) in Moberly, Missouri, at 1157.
Witnesses at KMBY observed the Cessna 177RG after landing and said the windscreen was completely obscured by ice and there was significant ice accumulated on the rest of the airplane that was about ¼ inch thick.
The pilot requested assistance deicing the airplane and the witnesses helped put the airplane in a heated hangar to melt the ice. They also added 16.88 gallons of fuel to the airplane.
The pilot told one of the witnesses he would depart as soon as the airplane was deiced. He dismissed recommendations to stay the night at KMBY and departed after the weather improved.
He said he would fly north before turning west and that the weather was better to the north. He showed one witness a weather map on his cell phone, but the source of the weather map was not determined.
Neither witness knew the pilot’s exact destination, just that he planned to spend the night in Nebraska before he continued to Colorado.
There was no record of communication between the pilot and air traffic control, and the pilot did not file a flight plan.
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) information, as well as data from an onboard avionics unit, showed that the accident flight originated from KMBY about 1410. The airplane continued north about 30 miles, turned northwest for about 40 miles, and then flew west-southwest until the ADS-B data ended at 1440, about six miles northeast of the accident site in Galt, Missouri.
The ADS-B recorded altitudes began at 1,100 feet mean sea level (msl) and the airplane reached a maximum altitude of 1,900 feet msl before it began a gradual descent that continued until the data ended at 1,200 feet msl.
Terrain along the route of flight varied between about 750 feet and 950 feet msl. The elevation at the accident site was about 785 feet msl.
The National Weather Service (NWS) AWC Current Icing Products (CIP) indicated an icing probability ranging from 45% to 65% at 1400 and increasing to over 65% at 1500, with the icing severity from light-to-moderate intensity at 1,000 to 2,000 feet above ground level.
The NWS Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) issued at 1301 and valid for 1500 expected surface wind from the north-northeast at 5 to 10 knots over the accident site, with visibility restricted less than 3 miles in light freezing drizzle and snow over the route of flight. The central section of the GFA Cloud Cover product issued at 1302 and valid for 1500 depicted an extensive area of overcast clouds with bases at 1,700 feet msl and tops above 31,000 feet msl.
There were no records to indicate that the pilot obtained a weather briefing before the flight.
The 1355 recorded observation at KMBY included wind from 030° at 9 knots, 1-3/4 statute miles visibility, scattered clouds at 600 feet agl, broken ceiling at 1,500 feet agl, overcast at 2,700 feet agl, temperature -12°C, dew point -16°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.20 inches of mercury.
The wreckage was located in a wooded area about six miles west of the last recorded ADS-B point. The initial impact occurred with trees about 30 feet above the ground. The pilot and his passenger died in the crash.
The airplane was accounted for in its entirety at the accident site. Both wings and portions of the horizontal stabilizer were separated at impact and located near the initial impact point. The engine, fuselage, and vertical stabilizer were about 200 feet south of the initial impact point. Damage and dispersion of the wreckage prevented determination of the airplane’s attitude at the time of impact.
Flight control continuity to the ailerons could not be verified due to impact damage. Multiple separations were noted in the aileron control cables consistent with overload. Flight control continuity was verified to the rudder and to the elevator attach points.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s decision to takeoff into instrument meteorological conditions consisting of low ceilings and icing and his failure to remain clear of terrain while attempting to remain below the clouds, which resulted in impact with terrain.
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This February 2021 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
That is why I like my Microlight. When it so cold I just don’t fly. Not much icing here in the African Bush but frost on wings have caused early morning take off accidents
Kcps, St. Louis Downtown Airport is located in Cahokia, IL. The pilot should have known how lucky he was to be able to make it as far as he did and landed safely. I don’t care how important it was to make it to the destination. In aviation it is always better to be late on arrival than it is to never arrive at all.
Another sad story and even though this is taught to us while training it seems to go out the window for some and we continue to have these preventable accidents. I did my instrument check ride in and out of actual conditions and heard this is our last approach we are picking up ice don’t blow it. Parked the plane and the examiner and I went over the plane and he had me explain about icing and the consequences of it he then passed me. Even though the ice was light in a small plane it doesn’t take much. that check ride and what my instructors taught me during my training have stuck with me to this day.
I taught my students that if they want to enjoy aviation, to be comfortable with aircraft, they must learn to trust themselves. It’s not acceptable to think everything will be all right, one must know it will. Nothing is more unknown than marginal weather.
The Grim Reaper named Get-there-itis claims another victim. I wonder what was so compelling about that trip to fly in those conditions? Doesn’t matter now.
Recently I was scheduled to fly with an instrument student. Ceilings were 7-900’ with the freezing level from the surface. Cancelled the lesson but discussed it with my student so he understood even with an instrument rating sometimes the flight will be a no-go. Later the same morning a plane took off from an airport 9 miles away, encountered icing and declared an emergency, fortunately landing at our airport, covered in ice. Then unbelievably a C182 takes off. Never heard anything so I guess they were successful. So yes, it still happens.
I think this keeps happening because there are not enough examples like this for CFIIs and *CFIs* to demonstrate very clearly the issues with icing. You knew this was a bad idea, but when that first plane landed covered with ice — Hopefully that student was still there to witness it and clearly see why you said this was a bad idea.
One of the problems with online and or smart device app training for IFR is the lack of hangar talk relative to IMC experiences and those who managed to get iced up, and how, even though they thought they were not going to incur those conditions….
BTDT.
If you look at the NTSB link, it begins “The instrument rated pilot…..”. The cancelled lesson you did may have been the most important lesson the guy ever had.
It keeps happening over and over ! Why? Only God knows………
I doubt even God knows.