This is an excerpt from a report made to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. The narrative is written by the pilot, rather than FAA or NTSB officials. To maintain anonymity, many details, such as aircraft model or airport, are often scrubbed from the reports.
This situation occurred during the second of a series of planned touch and go practice landings.
While on base leg, beginning the turn to about half mile final, I noticed that a helicopter, which had also been doing practice patterns in the helicopter pattern on the south side of the runway, was hovering in place a few feet above the numbers. I then began leveling off, adding power, and announced over CTAF that I was going around.
The helicopter radioed that it would move from the end of the runway to maneuver over the taxiway to the south side of Runway XX and it began to move to the south.
I acknowledged the helicopter pilot’s actions by saying my aircraft call sign and “thank you” over CTAF, and then began an attempt to salvage the touch and go pattern and landing. I pointed the nose of the plane at the threshold of the runway, reduced power to idle, and added full flaps. I began to notice that the unusually steep descent angle was resulting in an airspeed increase of almost 30 mph above my normal final approach speed.
Additionally, this fast final approach speed, coupled with the helicopter’s relatively low takeoff speed, was resulting in a rapid closure rate between my airplane and the helicopter, which by now was executing an upwind leg over the parallel taxiway.
It was becoming apparent at that point that the energy inherent in my aircraft’s speed and altitude would prevent safe accomplishment of a touch and go or even a full stop landing.
At that point I initiated a go around by adding power and leveling off over the runway. I was still closing rapidly on the helicopter, and now began to encounter significant roll and pitch excursions, which I suspected were due to the helicopter’s rotor down wash.
I immediately made a 15-20° turn to the right (north) to get out of the suspected down wash, which also created additional lateral separation from the helicopter’s flight path over the parallel taxiway. This heading resulted in a ground track which crossed over a building complex abutting the airfield, immediately to the north of the airfield boundary.
As a result I flew over these buildings at an altitude well below the normally required FAA vertical clearance.
I had never intended to do anything other than a touch and go landing, albeit with a relatively short final approach leg, as I have done safely and successfully many dozens of times previously.
What really caused the problem was that I allowed my impulse to not allow the helicopter pilot’s politeness to be wasted, to override my initial decision to go around, and attempted to salvage a touch and go landing from an unusual position, in an intentionally tight pattern that offers minimal margin for correcting off-nominal altitude and speed.
To prevent a recurrence I should continue with original decision to go around under these circumstances. Don’t allow sense of politeness to interfere in the face of judgment about speed and altitude needed for safe aircraft operation. I should have simply continued with my initial decision to go around, and just say “thank you.”
A pattern with a half mile final offers little margin to correct for off-nominal altitude and airspeed variations, even when full power is only added for a scant few seconds. I should not allow “politeness” to be an inordinately important decision factor in such situations.
I have gained a great amount of appreciation for the need for separation when flying below, behind, and to the side of helicopters taking off from a parallel taxiway.
I have a refreshed appreciation for the limited ability to dissipate excess energy (altitude and airspeed) on short final while flying an intentionally tightened practice pattern.
Primary Problem: Human Factors
ACN: 1901745
The helicopter may have been polite to clear the active runway to a parallel taxiway, however evidently not polite enough to hold until the fixed wing was clear, whether executing a go around or continuing the approach. Once the helicopter cleared the runway it belonged to the aircraft on final and the helicopter fell under the rule to remain clear of the flow of fixed wing traffic if it was departing from other than the runway.