On March 9, 2019, a Cessna T337C was destroyed during an inflight breakup and subsequent crash into trees and terrain near Longview, Texas. The private pilot and three passengers were fatally injured.
Day instrument meteorological conditions with convective activity prevailed in the area about the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed. The cross-country flight departed from Lancaster Regional Airport (KLNC) in Texas, and was destined for the Lakefront Airport, near New Orleans.
An employee at KLNC reported that the pilot and three other people came to the airport. The pilot came inside and bought a quart of oil. The employee indicated the pilot was in a good mood said they were flying to Louisiana. The pilot then went out and conducted a 10-minute preflight where he put the oil in the front engine. Then they entered the airplane, started it up, and let the airplane run for about five minutes. The airplane was then taxied toward the south ramp out of sight. The self-serve fuel was located in that area and the employee indicated it was a long enough period of time for the pilot to service the airplane with fuel. Afterward, the airplane took off and flew away.
The employee added that a severe thunderstorm went through about an hour before the plane took off. At the time of departure, the thunderstorm had passed through and the weather present at KLNC was “clear.”
A witness who was near the accident site in Longview, Texas, about the time of the accident reported that he was waiting for the storm to come and pass through. The wind picked up “hard” out of the west gusting over 35 mph, and rain fell in “sheets.” There was a single lighting strike. He said that the strike seemed to hit ground about 1/4 mile northwest of his house. It was the only local strike of the storm that he heard.
Approximately a minute after the strike, the witness heard what sounded like an “Air Tractor” coming in for a pass. He heard no impact and saw nothing in the air. The ceiling was “no more than 100 feet.”
He said, “I didn’t really believe at the time it could have possibly been an aircraft. Thought maybe static electricity in the clouds, or maybe a small tornado attempting to form.”
A friend of the family later reported that the airplane was missing and an alert notice was issued.
A witness driving down a road to go hunting noticed scattered trash along a clearway above an underground pipeline in a wooded area. He looked further at the trash and saw that it was an airplane crash. He called 911.
A National Weather Service (NWS) surface analysis chart showed the accident site was located ahead of a cold front and near a secondary trough of low pressure in an area favorable for the development of a multicellular line thunderstorm or squall line.
In addition, an NWS convective outlook graphic depicted that a slight risk of severe thunderstorms were possible for the route of flight over eastern Texas and Louisiana, including the accident site. A convective outlook bulletin indicated that a line of strong-to-severe thunderstorms had already developed over northeast Texas ahead of the cold front and was moving to the east-northeast. The convection was identified as linear in nature with embedded line echo wave pattern and bow echoes formations and isolated supercell-type thunderstorms. The line was expected to produce damaging winds, sporadic hail, and the threat of a tornado.
The NWS issued a series of in-flight aviation weather advisories that were valid for the time surrounding the accident and the route of flight. The advisories warned of severe thunderstorms, IFR conditions, moderate turbulence, low-level wind shear, and icing.
Investigators could not find evidence that the pilot, who was not instrument-rated, had checked the weather.
Probable Cause: The noninstrument-rated pilot’s improper decision to continue flight into convective weather conditions, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its maximum maneuvering speed and the subsequent in-flight breakup. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s inadequate preflight weather planning and his inadequate inflight weather avoidance of that weather.
This March 2019 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
In my younger, foolisher years, I flew in conditions I wouldn’t consider today, but always after getting a good weather briefing, in an airplane I knew well, and being current and proficient on instruments, with a current Class II physical. Because this last year has been pretty limiting, I’m current and proficient only VFR, still with a Class II, so I wouldn’t even consider an IMC flight. I might fly the local area without a weather briefing, but I wouldn’t go very far without one. Why am I so much different from this accident pilot? No idea what was on his mind, but I really like living!
SUCH TERRIBLE ACTIONS BY A CERTFIED PILOT, A PILOTS ACTIONS ,AND RESPONSIBILTY TO HIS PASSENGERS WHO DEPEND ON HIM SOLEY.
When I flew in Alaska , some years ago, we were flying mail and passengers, each day was like a must go, When we gathered in the morning to check conditions, weather, loads, aircraft, some one would say did anybody check dispatch? or check the weather yourself, if things looked a little bleak,
Somebody would say , WHAT FOR WE ARE GOING ANYWAY.
Worth reading is a book, “The Anvil of the Gods”
WEATHER FLYING. buy BOB BUCK.
Humidity has more to do with WX than pressure when the Sun heats it.
Hard charger, ego filled who doubtless figured he didn’t need a medical, an AMEL, logbook or anything else.
Aviation, more than most hobbies, will unwrap Darwinism pretty quickly.
Sea lawyer hyperbole serves no purpose.
EC,
I hope your “sea lawyer” comment was not directed to me.
My comments here were primarily made to add more information from the NTSB’s report, that was not presented in the article, for consideration of other pilots in their own aeronautical decision making.
My note about the law was intended solely to point out that Mr. Carter’s comments, while perhaps initially seeming to be rather harsh, might actually be seen to be correct
… And, unbelievably, the story gets worse.
I just read the complete NTSB Final Report on this accident, which is their Accident Number: CEN19FA094. Additional negative findings that were not included in this article are that:
(1) The pilot had been denied an FAA Medical Certificate at his last exam about seven months before the accident, because he was taking a non-approved medication for diabetes , and therefore was flying without a valid medical of any kind (including BasicMed).
(2) The pilot did not have a current Flight Review, and his logbook showed that he may have only made one flight in the previous 14 years before the accident flight.
(3) Although he owned the accident aircraft, the pilot had no multiengine rating and appeared to have only received about one hour of instruction in a flight training device set up as a conventional multiengine aircraft before flying his aircraft on his own.
(4) Post-accident toxicology testing showed the pilot had taken a beta blocker used in the treatment of high blood pressure and certain heart arrhythmias.
(5) Radar tracking showed that the aircraft flew eastward and entered areas of weather (precipitation), then turned back westward, then again flew eastward and entered another area of weather, with the flight ending in a descending spiral in that area of weather near the accident site.
The pattern here seems pretty obvious.
The saddest part of this story is that the poor passengers most likely had not the slightest comprehension of the qualifications, or rather the lack of qualifications, of the man in whom they had entrusted their lives.
The passengers were his wife, daughter and her boyfriend. Sad
As a side note of legal reference, this situation could quite likely be an example of third-degree murder, also known as manslaughter. In most states, it is described as “unlawful killing that doesn’t involve malice aforethought, which means there was no intent to seriously harm or kill, or extreme, reckless disregard for life”.
One might even argue that the actions or inaction of the pilot was worse than manslaughter, because his failure to follow accepted procedures and FAA regulations (no preflight weather briefing, no instrument flight plan, flying in IMC without being IFR rated and current, etc.) DID show “extreme, reckless disregard for life”.
Exactly my earlier point, and with the litigious society we have to live in today you can rest assured that any surviving family members of the pilot will have almost nothing to live on other than the terrible memory of his loss.
As pilots we “cheat death” with each flight so why even think of stacking the odds against ourselves?
Really Sad is what this is… The needless loss of four lives and what was probably a perfectly good aircraft, the indescribable losses suffered by family and friends, the resultant increased insurance costs for other aircraft owners and pilots, and one more huge black eye for all of General Aviation in the minds of the general public.
I certainly understand that there are times, albeit only very occasionally, when the weather can simply “develop around you”, essentially “trapping” a pilot with little other reasonable action left available than to just put it down off-airport somewhere. However, this does not appear to have been one of those times.
What I will never understand is the type of thinking process, or lack of any reasonable thought at all, that causes a non-instrument-rated pilot to make the decision to take off, whether with or without a weather briefing, into what had to be conditions that were quite clearly so questionable at best.
Whether you call it social pressure, get-there-itis, expectation/completion bias, foolhardiness, or simply ego, how can it be that so many among us pilots continue to make these sorts of decisions, fully-well knowing (if only from reading the accident reports and numbers) that they may have such terribly grave consequences??? How can the hoped-for outcome(s) ever outweigh the risks???
As pilots in the USA, we have the incredible “freedom of the skies” found virtually nowhere else on the planet. I am certain that we will only keep that freedom if we, as a group, continue both to fight for it politically and to make better decisions about how and when we exercise that freedom. To help me, I have always tried to keep an old quote at the forefront of my aeronautical decision-making… “Aviation, in and of itself, is not inherently dangerous. However, to an even greater extent than the sea, it is extremely unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity, or neglect”.
Very judgmental comments serve no useful purpose
This wasn’t an accident, it was murder.
No, it was stupid and suicidal.
Had the pilot checked weather ANF flown a route that deviated around the weather it might have added maybe an hour.
Just a quests…they were going to game?
While it was suicidal for the pilot, the 3 passengers didn’t have any choice once he went gear up. I don’t believe they would all voluntarily commit simultaneous suicide.
As pilots we are completely responsible for the safe delivery of our passengers to the destination and intentionally flying them into IMC conditions that a pilot or aircraft isn’t equipped to handle is not an accidental decision.
Yes, he was a fellow pilot, but that should not grant him any forgiveness and label these as accidental deaths.
You are correct that HAD the pax known the pilot wasn’t qualified they could have declined.
But pax often put their schedule demands first.
I have personally told pax that despite their desire to be 1,000 miles away in the morning that ” I was tired, the wx was bad and I was going to sleep.”
This was easy, at that time I was the only 300 King air available to fly their airplane. Their 2 company pilot’s had failed their type checkride. To be that was probably because the FAA didn’t know that the Collins FMS90 changed sensitively when tuned to an ILS frequency.
The Bryant helicopter crash was his demand to be there on time and the pilot’s unwillingness to say NO. ( my opinion)
FAA regs didn’t allow single pilot helicopter Of seven in a fully equalled copter and pilot.
I appreciate your response, but there is nothing in the article or in the Accident Report that indicated this was a flight driven by any passenger schedule or demands. This was unlike the Bryant crash which was a part 135 operation – was not a for-hire / for-compensation flight. Any pressure the PIC felt was self-induced.
This PIC is solely responsible for his actions which took the lives of 3 other individuals, and it was his sole decision (based on post-event evidence).
My original response was meant to shock and elicit recognition of our responsibility as pilots in command to protect the lives and well-being of our passengers. If we make a stupid decision and kill ourselves, that’s too bad. If we make stupid decisions that take the lives of others, then that is murder. I don’t see much gray area here.
As far as learning something from this report, what can it teach us other than pilots with egos continue to make stupid decisions? We have been learning this lesson since humans took flight, and even before (think Icarus).
Unfortunately 3 innocent people paid with their lives because of an ego that couldn’t pay the price.