On March 1, 2019, a Cessna 182S was destroyed when it hit terrain after takeoff from Triangle North Executive Airport (KLHZ), in Louisburg, North Carolina. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured.
Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed.
The pilot obtained his IFR clearance by telephone before departure. The clearance instructed him to depart from Runway 23, fly a heading of 180°, and climb to an altitude of 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl).
After takeoff, a radar target identified as his Cessna 182 was acquired at 1920:03 over the runway at 425 feet msl (about 60 feet above ground level) and 91 knots groundspeed. The plane maintained the approximate runway heading until 1920:56, when it entered a right turn while at 1,225 feet msl (about 860 feet agl) and 99 knots groundspeed.
About a minute after takeoff, the Cessna 182 reached the top of its climb at 1,300 feet msl (about 930 feet agl) while in the turn. Afterward, it entered a descending right turn while its groundspeed began to accelerate. The last radar target, at 1921:17, showed the airplane at an altitude of 625 feet (about 260 feet agl) and a groundspeed of 145 knots, in the vicinity of the accident site.
Interpolation of the radar data toward the bottom of the descent revealed a descent rate of about 6,000 feet per minute.
Communication between the pilot and air traffic control was never established.
Two airport employees witnessed the takeoff and reported they heard the airplane’s engine “power up,” which surprised them because they had not noticed the airplane taxi past them or heard the pilot perform an engine run-up. The airplane’s lights were not clearly visible in the fog and had a “halo” appearance.
The witnesses also reported that the airplane accelerated and that the sound of the engine was smooth and continuous throughout the takeoff roll and the takeoff. The witnesses lost sight of the airplane when it was about 200 to 300 feet above the runway, which was about the same time that the airplane entered the clouds.
One of the airport employees described the weather conditions as “foggy in moderate rain.” The other airport employee indicated that there were “low clouds and a lot of rain” and that he wondered “who would want to fly in this [weather]?”
Several witnesses who lived near the airport stated that they heard the airplane just after it took off flying “low overhead” and that the engine “went in full throttle” when the sounds of impact were heard.
One witness stated that “it was raining so hard” at the time of the accident that it disabled his satellite television signal.
At 1920, the weather recorded at KLHZ included scattered clouds at 300 feet, a broken ceiling at 600 feet, an overcast ceiling at 1,100 feet, and winds from 20° at 4 knots. Visibility was 5 statute miles in rain. The temperature was 4°C, and the dew point was 4°C. The altimeter setting was 30.08 inches of mercury.
About an hour before departure, the pilot obtained an on-line weather briefing from ForeFlight that included terminal area forecasts for low IFR conditions, AIRMETs for low-level wind shear, and a pilot report for severe turbulence along the airplane’s proposed route of flight. According to ForeFlight officials, the pilot did not view any weather imagery before the flight or obtain any updates or additional weather information before or during the flight.
A commercial pilot and flight instructor who flew with the pilot recreationally and in the Coast Guard Auxiliary stated that he was “proficient” but was a “heavy user” of the autopilot and that he would routinely depart, set up the autopilot, and then contact air traffic control.
When asked about the pilot’s mission planning and operational risk management assessments for flights with the Coast Guard Auxiliary, the flight instructor stated that he was “proficient” in those skills. When asked how those skills transferred to the pilot’s personal flying habits, the flight instructor stated that he “abandoned” those practices when he flew for personal business or pleasure.
The aircraft broker who sold the airplane to the pilot in December 2012 was also based at KLHZ. The broker stated that he had watched the pilot depart in the airplane under visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) on numerous occasions before he acquired an instrument rating.
The broker also stated that, after he acquired his instrument rating, the Cessna 182 pilot departed in conditions that the broker considered challenging for a small single-engine airplane. The broker added that he had cautioned the pilot “numerous” times about flying VFR into IMC and about overall risk management and risk decisions when flying into IMC, when measured against the equipment one operated, but that “there was no getting through to him.”
The airplane came to rest partially submerged on the southwest side of a creek about 1.5 miles beyond the departure end of the runway. Several pieces of angularly cut wood were found below damaged treetops on the northeast bank of the creek.
The wreckage was destroyed by impact forces and displayed no evidence of pre- or postimpact fire. All major components were accounted for at the scene except for most of the right wing structure, including the right flap and flap actuator. Those parts were later recovered when the creek water receded.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s spatial disorientation and loss of airplane control following takeoff in night instrument meteorological conditions.
This March 2019 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
If it was day , VMC, the pilot would have flown runway heading to at least 400–500 feet AGL before turning
An IFR DEPARTURE into IMC doesn’t change ‘that expectation in Arcs mind.
Was there an IFR DEPARTURE published? If not the IFR missed approach offers guidance about safe terrain.
Rushing to your death is never a safe plan.
The pilot’s reckless habits were bound to catch up with him sooner or later so no surprise there. As they say, “There is no cure for stupidity’.
The real tragedy is that two innocent people died because they falsely believed they could entrust their lives to his judgement and flying skills. That is unforgivable.