The flight instructor in the retractable landing gear Mooney M20J reported that, during final to the airport in Ridgeland, S.C., there were no abnormal weather conditions, but as the airplane passed over the runway threshold, the airplane encountered “severe wind shear” that he believed to be a “microburst.”
The airplane pitched up, rolled left, and they added full power to go-around.
During the go-around the instructor took control of the airplane, and left the landing gear down, full flaps, and propeller full forward. He added that, the airplane “simply” did not have enough performance to climb. Subsequently, the airplane drifted left of the runway and hit a gravel hill.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing.
The flight instructor reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The automated weather observation system about 14 nautical miles from the airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was variable at 3 knots, temperature 73°F, dew point 68°F, and altimeter 30.14 inches of mercury and cloud condition was reported as FEW at 500 feet. The airplane landed on Runway 3.
The pilot reported the weather at the airport was wind light and variable not gusting, visibility 10 miles, and FEW clouds at 2,000 feet. The instructor reported the wind as calm to light and variable, visibility 10 miles, and FEW clouds at 5,000 feet.
Further, the instructor reported that during the go-around the airplane’s configuration with full flaps for landing was not changed. The airplane’s POH under Go Around (balked landing) states that following establishing a climb the flaps should be reduced to the takeoff setting.
Probable Cause: The flight instructor’s failure to retract the flaps during an attempted go-around and his failure to maintain the runway heading, which resulted in a collision with terrain left of the runway.
Our reviewers are guessing that no real “wind shear” was present here given the reported benign conditions. It seems this relatively inexperienced CFI was too late with the go-around (CFIs should always define — and enforce — a pre-determined “comfort zone” for safety).
This CFI also never retracted the flaps per POH (poor technique) and failed to apply adequate rudder, sacrificing performance and losing control.
Perhaps this pilot’s recent (and more extensive) twin time caused him expect greater performance?
This February 2019 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
The crash scene pics show that the clouds, at least at that airport were definitely not at 500 ft as that AWOS had reported and it is strange that there could such a discrepancy with an airport just 14 miles away (both near sea level). The instructor claimed the possibility of a microburst but as I recall you need some significant convective weather to get one of those so that seems like a rather lame excuse, And to add to that the wind was reported as light and variable so where would severe wind shear come from?
As for the instructor he had an ATP and over 1500 hours so he was no rookie in aviation but nothing indicates just how many of those hours were spent providing instruction. With that ATP ticket he was qualified to crew an airliner so his poor performance in this critical situation is not very reassuring as to whether he would truly competent for that position of trust. When you add the instructors claims for meteorological conditions to his poor performance in this critical situation I am not so sure that I would like to have him in the cockpit the next time I fly on an airlines.
This event occurred with a FI at the commands of the aircraft? An FI, really?