After refueling the Beech C35, the pilot and the pilot-rated passenger took off to return to the pilot’s home airport.
During the initial climb, the airplane accelerated to about 67 knots and reached an altitude of about 170′ above ground level before it began to slow and lose altitude, consistent with a loss of engine power.
Although more than 2,300′ of relatively level grassy terrain suitable for an emergency landing remained ahead of the airplane, the pilot made a left turn back toward the departure end of the runway at the airport in Camden, Arkansas.
During the turn, the airplane entered a steep left spiral, hit the ground, and caught fire. Both people on board the plane died in the crash.
The airplane’s left main fuel tank cap was found on the left side of the runway about 1,000′ from the threshold and 4,500′ from the main wreckage. The cap’s locking lever was engaged, and it showed no fire or impact damage.
The fuel selector valve was found positioned to the right main fuel tank feed position.
Flight control continuity was confirmed, and no other preimpact anomalies were found.
According to the pilot operating handbook for the airplane, the fuel selector should be on the left main fuel tank for takeoff. It is likely that the left main fuel tank cap was not secured after the airplane was refueled and fell off the airplane’s left wing onto the runway during the takeoff. Without the cap in place, fuel escaped from the left main fuel tank and subsequently starved the engine of fuel during the climb, resulting in the power loss.
The pilot likely switched the fuel selector to the right main fuel tank in an attempt to restart the engine. When he tried to turn back to the airport, he failed to maintain a safe airspeed, and the airplane exceeded its critical angle of attack and entered an aerodynamic stall.
Probable cause: The pilot’s improper decision to return to the runway instead of landing straight ahead when the engine lost power and his failure to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering for an emergency landing, which resulted in an exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to properly secure the left main fuel tank cap after refueling, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel starvation during the takeoff climb.
NTSB Identification: CEN17FA364
This September 2017 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
I try to have a plan and a checklist ready to use. Making a spur of the moment life threatening decision in an instant of panic is foolhardy. Fly the aircraft by staying ahead of it. Try not to be caught short viewing the scenery. I always think that the aircraft is trying to kill me. Have an escape plan, a checklist, and stay alert. You might live to see your destination.
“Making a spur of the moment life threatening decision in an instant of panic is foolhardy.” Yes, sadly in 2002 at the airport where I am based (4B8), an attempt was made to turn back, control was lost, and the husband and wife perished. The FAA is doing the right thing to incorporate training in turnbacks, not necessarily to be able to do them, but to have a much better understanding of when not to do them.
Yet General Aviation News published this on May 29, 2019 – “The Impossible Turn is Now Possible” https://generalaviationnews.com/2019/05/29/the-impossible-turn-is-now-possible/
The impossible turn is not possible. Suggesting such is an irresponsible thing to ponder or suggest.
From 170 feet agl, it is impossible. From an adequate altitude for the aircraft involved, and with proper understanding of all elements including airplane performance and pilot proficiency (actual training and practice in the maneuver), it is possible. A video taken from the cockpit during a turnback demonstration is included in your webinar link starting at 1h:00m:32s.
Sure. Do you have the where-with-all to instantly assess all those variables in the 5 seconds or less to make that decision? Most pilots are over 50 these days…the article is suggesting something that is gonna hurt or kill someone one day.
Perhaps this report is about a guy that read the article and went for it.
The appropriate and responsible pre-flight thought process should ONLY and ALWAYS include planning a straight ahead emergency landing, or even better…fly a Cirrus or Flight Design or Evolution and pull the chute.
So, what happens when you pull the chute at 170 agl?
As the video explains, the variables are elements such as altitude needed for a particular aircraft, airport traffic, runway length for gliding distance needed, surrounding terrain, etc., and the pilot’s current proficiency. Before the takeoff, the pilot would decide whether a turnback is going to be an option depending on the variables and if it is, then target an altitude. The video recommends an altitude with plenty of room for error. So that makes it a simple consideration – before that altitude no turnback – after reaching that altitude a turnback is an option.
Also as mentioned in the video the FAA has incorporated this training in AC-61-83J which provides guidance for industry-conducted flight instructor refresher courses. Paragraph A.11.4 Return to Field/Engine Failure on Takeoff. Flight instructors should demonstrate and teach trainees when and how to make a safe 180-degree turnback to the field after an engine failure.
The big question is did any of the 27 gallons of fuel get put into the left main tank ? It’s hard to imagine that much fuel would be lost during the few minutes of the takeoff.
It’s sad that an experienced pilot would make the mistake of trying to get back to the runway at 170 ft alt., vs landing straight ahead on the grassy field. ?
I had a good friend die under similar circumstances.
Yes, agree..