The pilot reported he landed farther down the snow- and ice-covered runway in Soldotna, Alaska, than anticipated due to being “a little high and a little fast” during the approach.
He added that he applied brakes but that he was not slowing down quickly enough and determined that there was not enough runway remaining to attempt a go-around.
He controlled the airplane “the best he could until he hit the snow berm at the end of the runway.” The airplane nosed over.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the windshield.
The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause: The pilot’s unstabilized approach and failure to attain the proper touchdown point, which resulted in a runway overrun and collision with a snowbank.
NTSB Identification: GAA17CA210
This March 2017 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
My 1st private pilot license was issued by the CIA, a seemingly honest agency, but for the last 60 years the FAA has seemingly becoming less & less trustful, e.g. TWA 800, 9/11, max.load sales on new airliners, faulty electronic controls; remember the Airbus 320 introduced in 1972 which flew straight into the forest on it’s first (autopilot) take-off! We missed a big chance to rid ourselves of their unacknowledgable presence recently but… alas! If only they could be taught such skills as crosswind landings.
Again in an effort to battle misinformation on the internet. The Airbus was launched in 1984. First flight was 1987. The Airbus crash that you are referring to was in 1988. The crash was a result of the demonstration pilot not understanding the flight control system(pilot error and inadequate training). Both of the 737 Max crashes IMHO could have been avoided if the pilots understood the system(pilot error and inadequate training). Interesting platform to vent your opinion on augmented flight control systems. However, they do all have the theme: Pilot error and inadequate training.
I have never flown an Airbus but I am typed in the 737 and flown a PA22.
Guess I’m getting old, it was the CAA which issued my Private license,… not the CIA!
I agree with all comments. I was trying to explain why the NTSB called this an unstabilized approach. Gene Benson has done a number of FAA approved webinars and we discussed this concept, with which I had some arguments also. In discussing it with him more than two years ago he said the objective is to give someone something definitive to move the go-around decision from the subjective to the objective. Gene’s list comes from FAA guidelines. I don’t remember the exact reference he gave me then, but it may have been AC 91-79A.
Ref the eight ‘stabilized approach’ items: I might concur whole heartedly with the list if it was prefaced with something like: “If any of the following items occur below 100 feet above runway elevation, consideration should be given to abandoning the approach”.
However, to flat out suggest as that the list, as displayed, should become “de rigueur” for experienced pilots is somewhat “outré”…
A “fer instance”… Fitting a light turbo-prop (Commander 1000) into the jet traffic in Boston Logan. Clearance is received for the approach and… “maintain at least 170 to the marker”. Aircraft is held a 195 (gear speed) until the marker, at which time the power is reduced and the gear is dropped. Speed continues to fall and the half flap is selected at 174. Speed continues to fall and full flap selected at a point designed to allow the aircraft to flash across the button on speed and in the flare. Select beta and turn off at the first available!
The only thing stable about the approach was that it was on glide slope… (;>0)
The only unstabilized culprit here is the pilot…If he says he was high and fast, he was unstabilized !!!
Sorry, Warren, I stated my Airline time as 34,000 hrs., that was actually my total time,… it was only 23,000 hrs. with the Air Lines.
As stated on the bottom of your tab: “For TRAINING purposes only”! Nothing in the article describes him as an unlicensed pilot in training. The FAA now even encourages airline pilots to engage auto-pilots for approaches & landings, nothing any aviator would do in my 34,000 hours in 4-engine Boeings and the L1011 except as required in line-checks because, for one thing, no auto-pilot with ability to make a crosswind landing has ever yet been produced… and only pilots WITH that abiliity should receive ATPs.
The autoland crosswind limit for the 757/767 I am flying now is 15 kts. Although I mostly hand fly approaches, I use the autopilot occasionally and it handles crosswind approaches and landings beautifully. So did the other autoland airplanes I’ve flown, and the crosswind limit for autoland was always at least 15 kts.
Always curious about engine and wing-tip ground clearances in those models. What is the maximum bank allowed in a landing?
Crosswind limits for the 757/767 are 29 or 30 knots, depending on the operator. Boeing allows full slip to full crab landings, and anything in between. Full crab probably not a great idea with passengers. Pod or wingtip clearance is not a problem, as long as you don’t exceed the crosswind limits, so the bank angle isn’t published as far as I’m aware. Tail strike in these airplanes is a much bigger concern.
The metropolitan airports have many more runways now than were available a half-century ago in the days of the 707s and early 747s. 15 kts. wasn’t strong enough to be considered a crosswind… even for the poor, dumb V-tailed models (planes not pilots). We flew the entire approach on centerline heading with a stable slip, which gradually reduced speed to touchdown, increasing the rudder & aileron being held even after the upwind gear trucks were rolling on the runway with the nosewheel being held off for quite awhile… air is cheaper than rubber! Even 40 kts was not considered too strong, depending of course on it’s steadiness. Never heard of anyone having a wingtip strike!
We used to go up in the tower at Hong Kong (the old airport by the bay) and watch the flights coming in on autopilot, rudder & aileron neutral, and trying to flare and kick-out the skid both at the same time,… pitiful!
I would quibble with the NTSB comment about being “Unstabilized”.
Being “High” and “Fast” does not mean ‘unstabilized’. If the runway had been 10000 feet long, an eventual normal landing would probably have ensued.
“High and Fast leading to a long landing” would have sufficed…
John – I agree with you completely. This is the latest FAA speak. One list of criteria I saw used today for a stabilized approach has ‘The airplane is on the correct flight path’ as the first item. So if the airplane is high, instead of saying the airplane is overshooting (the old phraseology), now they say it is not stabilized.
He failed to exercise ‘go-around’ judgement, if he even had any.
THAT was the cause of his accident! There is no evidence at all that his approach was unstabilized! Are your news staff really pilots?
You are correct – he apparently miscalculated the rollout he would have and need and decided to land when he should have gone around. He also may have had a stabilized descent angle and airspeed as you and I would think about it. But from what I have seen more recently in discussions of approaches, if the airplane is not on the correct glide path, it is now considered ‘not stabilized’. I.e. ‘stabilized’ now doesn’t mean what it used to mean. See https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/53d483e0-0cf8-4d83-a07c-b18a7658adf9/stabilized_approach.pdf as one example.
“stabilized_approach.pdf” Gliders are airplanes! The hundreds of pilots I’ve taught to fly gliders were concerned with none of those 8 considerations except #4, which didn’t apply to most gliders anyway!